2020 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-4-2020

USA v. Devlon Saunders

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Devlon Saunders" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 1098.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/1098

This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-1969
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEVLON SAUNDERS,
a/k/a Dev,
a/k/a Shawn,
Appellant
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No.: 1:10-cr-00054-001)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_____________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 13, 2020
(Opinion Filed: December 4, 2020)
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, AND RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
___________
O P I N I O N*
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Devlon Saunders challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a
sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
132 Stat. 5194 (“Resentencing Motion”). Section 404 provides that district courts can
reduce the sentences of defendants who were convicted of offenses for which the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the penalties. Section 404(c) precludes a motion under
this section “if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance
with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
(Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372).” § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222. Because we agree
with the District Court that Saunders was sentenced “in accordance with” the Fair
Sentencing Act, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Saunders’ Resentencing
Motion.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In July 2010, Saunders moved to change his plea to guilty regarding one count of

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams and more of
cocaine base and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The penalties for this
offense are derived from 21 U.S.C. § 841. See 21 U.S.C. § 846.
The Fair Sentencing Act was enacted in August 2010. The Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 increased the drug weights of crack cocaine required to trigger certain mandatory
statutory penalties. Before its enactment, the statutory range for an offense which
involved 50 grams or more of crack cocaine was ten years to life imprisonment. See 21
U.S.C. § 841 (2006); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124
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Stat. 2372, 2372. After its enactment, the statutory range for the same quantity became
five to forty years imprisonment. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2018).
The District Court accepted Saunders’ plea on August 3, 2010.
In September 2010, for purposes of Saunders’ Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”), the U.S. Probation Officer applied the 2009 version of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Probation calculated Saunders’ custody range as 360 months to life and
identified the statutory penalties as ten years to life imprisonment.
The United States Sentencing Commission promulgated amendments to the
Guidelines corresponding to the reduced statutory penalties under the Fair Sentencing
Act. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual, Supp. § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2010).
These revised Guidelines became effective on November 1, 2010.
In the sentencing memorandum filed in February 2011, counsel for Saunders
raised multiple objections to the PSR. Specifically, counsel argued that the Guidelines
that correspond to the reductions in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 should have been
applied instead of the 2009 Guidelines. Counsel noted that the 2010 Guidelines were
promulgated in November 2010 and effective immediately. The 2010 Guidelines
reduced Saunders’ base offense level from 38 to 34.
Saunders was sentenced on March 3, 2011 to 180 months imprisonment, a threeyear term of supervised release, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. In the
Statement of Reasons, the Court acknowledged that it was applying the 2010 Guidelines.
Saunders appealed his sentence. We affirmed in an opinion filed on January 30,
2012. On November 23, 2015, the District Court resentenced Saunders to a term of
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imprisonment of 152 months based on a motion to reduce his sentence under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 2014 Supp. to App. C, Amendment 782 (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2014). After Saunders sent a letter to the District Court in November 2019
seeking relief under the First Step Act, appointed counsel filed a brief in support of
Saunders’s Resentencing Motion on March 20, 2020.
II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Court denied Saunders’ Resentencing Motion because it had applied

the Fair Sentencing Act in sentencing him. The District Court noted that “at sentencing,
the Court explicitly stated that it would apply the 2010 Guidelines Manual to Defendant.”
App. 8. The Court further explained that it is of no consequence that Saunders’ offenses
and guilty plea occurred before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act because the
2010 Guidelines that incorporated the changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act were
applied at his sentencing. The District Court also rejected Saunders’ argument that it had
sentenced him based on the heightened statutory range. Thus, the District Court decided
that Section 404 precluded his motion.
III.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, First Step Act § 404,
and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). See United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
2020). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
As to the proper interpretation of a statute, our review is plenary. See United States v.
Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020).
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IV.

DISCUSSION
We agree with the District Court that Saunders cannot seek relief under Section

404 of the First Step Act because his sentence was previously imposed in accordance
with the Fair Sentencing Act.
The First Step Act provides that “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered
offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” § 404(b), 132
Stat. at 5222. Section 404(a) defines “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal
criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act[.]” § 404(a), 132 Stat. at 5222. Under Section 2 of the Fair
Sentencing Act, Saunders would be subject to a statutory range of five to forty years.
See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372.
However, Section 404(c) of the First Step Act prohibits resentencing under Section 404
“if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the
amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law
111-220; 124 Stat. 2372).” § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222.
Saunders was sentenced “in accordance with” the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.
Saunders’ counsel argued that the 2010 Guidelines “implementing the provisions of the
Fair Sentencing Act” should apply because they were promulgated in November 2010
and effective immediately. The District Court accepted Saunders’ counsel’s argument.
The District Court explicitly stated in the Statement of Reasons that the 2010 Guidelines
applied.
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Saunders argues that he is nonetheless eligible for relief because the statutory
penalties for his offense were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. He argues that
eligibility under Section 404 turns on whether the statutory penalties were modified, not
whether the corresponding Guidelines range was applied. The Court did not
acknowledge the revised statutory penalties in the Statement of Reasons, so Saunders
also posits that he is not subject to Section 404(c) because he could not have been
sentenced “in accordance with” the Fair Sentencing Act.
Saunders’ argument is unavailing. The Court explicitly applied the 2010
Guidelines at sentencing and sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment. Saunders
provides no support to show that the statutory penalties affected his sentence. The Court
explicitly stated, “I think a guideline sentence is not only appropriate but even generous
under the circumstances. I believe that sentencing objectives will be met by a sentence
that is within the guideline range.” App. 75. Saunders’ sentence is within the 2010
Guidelines range and, importantly, it is significantly above both statutory minimums.
Saunders also acknowledged in his sentencing memorandum that the mandatory
minimum was not at issue in his case.
Saunders concedes that the District Court could refuse to exercise its discretion to
resentence him under Section 404(b) because the 2010 Guidelines were applied in
calculating his sentence. Still, he argues that the Court erred in finding him ineligible
under Section 404(a). Saunders’ attempt to reframe Section 404(c) as a separate issue for
the Court’s discretion, rather than a limitation on relief, contradicts the plain language of
the text. “No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence
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if . . .” unequivocally restricts relief under Section 404. See United States v. Jackson, 964
F.3d 197, 205 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020) (recognizing “a few specific limitations found within
the First Step Act,” and citing Section 404(c)).
At sentencing, the Court recognized that the penalties for Saunders’ offense
changed following the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and sentenced Saunders according to
the corresponding Guidelines. This renders Saunders ineligible for relief under Section
404 of the First Step Act.
V.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Saunders’

Resentencing Motion.
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